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OPINION OF THE COURT 
___________ 
 
 
LEWIS, Circuit Judge. 
 In this appeal, Walter Seipel and Susan Seipel 
("appellants") seek the reversal of a district court order 
denying their motion to intervene in a proceeding pending in that 
court.  The district court held that while the appellants' motion 
may be timely, "[t]he plain fact is that they have no interest at 
stake in the litigation, and no standing to become involved in 
it."  Mountain Top Condominium Association v. Stabbert, et. al., 
No. 1990/215, slip op. at 4 (D. V.I. Dec. 9, 1994).  Appellants 
argue that as a matter of law, their interest in the litigation 
is sufficient to support intervention as a matter of right under 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2).  We agree, and will reverse the 
district court's denial of appellants' motion to intervene. 
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    I. 
A. 
 The Seipels allege the following facts in their motion 
to intervene and their proposed "Complaint in Intervention." 
These facts are not disputed in the present record and appear to 
have been accepted by the district court in ruling on the motion 
to intervene. 
 On September 17, 1989, Hurricane Hugo struck the Virgin 
Islands and wreaked tremendous destruction.  Included in this 
natural disaster was the damage and destruction of several 
buildings which comprised the Mountain Top Condominiums, located 
on the island of St. Thomas.  The Mountain Top Condominiums are 
governed by the Mountain Top Condominium Association ("MTCA"), 
which is comprised of all of the condominium owners in the 
development.  The owners had delegated certain powers and duties, 
including the repair and restoration of the condominiums, to the 
MTCA's Board of Directors (the "Board") pursuant to the MTCA's 
bylaws and Virgin Islands law, Title 28 V.I.C. Chapter 33. 
 Pursuant to Article V, Sections 2 and 3 of the MTCA's 
By-laws, the MTCA's Board was required to appoint an Insurance 
Trustee to approve the adjustment of any loss, and to receive all 
insurance proceeds for losses in excess of $50,000.  There is no 
dispute that the Board did not comply with these requirements. 
 Instead, the Board took it upon itself to approve the 
insurance adjustment and to determine how the reconstruction and 
repair proceeds were to be distributed.  As a result, the Board 
adjusted the hurricane loss and received $1,538,613 from its 
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insurance carrier.  The Board then deposited this fund into a 
separate account specifically designated for hurricane 
reconstruction.  Rather than apply all of the insurance proceeds 
to repair the damage caused by Hurricane Hugo, however, the Board 
decided to distribute some of the proceeds to the individual 
condominium owners according to the size of the various 
condominium units,0 minus fifteen percent (15%) for the Board's 
supervision of the individual owners' reconstruction efforts. 
Under this plan, a larger unit would receive more from the fund 
than a smaller unit regardless of the damage sustained, and there 
was no requirement that the money be used to benefit the 
condominium units.  The appellants allege that this in turn has 
provided certain unit owners with a cash windfall.  The Board 
also included in the repair costs the reconstruction of five 
"deck extensions" which were not covered by the MTCA's insurance 
policy.0  Finally, in order to receive any money from the 
hurricane restoration fund, the Board required unit owners to 
sign general releases.  Apparently, the appellants are the only 
owners who refused to sign a release. 
                     
0
 $20,593 were allotted to two small units.  $21,482 were 
allotted to 14 medium units, and $24,251 were allotted for three 
large units.  The Seipels' unit at issue in this case was 
classified as a medium unit.  The Seipels' second unit was 
purchased after the distribution of $21,482 had been made to the 
Seipels' predecessors in interest. 
0
 Three of the five units with "deck extensions" are owned by 
members of the Board. 
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B. 
 As part of its reconstruction plan, the Board entered 
into an agreement with David Stabbert Master Builder, Inc., for 
construction work on the condominiums.0  The Board, however, was 
dissatisfied with the quality of the work performed by Stabbert 
and its subcontractors, and a dispute arose between the parties. 
As a result of this dispute, Huffman and Stabbert filed 
construction liens against the condominiums in the hope of 
recovering payment for their work.  The Board responded by filing 
a complaint against Stabbert and Huffman, alleging fraudulent 
misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, unfair trade 
practices, slander of title, injunctive relief, breach of 
contract, and damages.  Huffman and Stabbert filed counterclaims 
against the MTCA. 
 Later, Huffman and Stabbert agreed to release the 
liens.  In return, the Board deposited $250,000 of the insurance 
proceeds in escrow in the registry of the district court.  This 
sum represented all that remained of the hurricane reconstruction 
fund.  In February, 1994, pursuant to the district court's order, 
this dispute proceeded to mediation. 
C. 
 Appellants own two condominiums that were heavily 
damaged during Hurricane Hugo.  They believed that the 
distribution of funds for the reconstruction of their 
condominiums was not being accomplished in good faith.  Thus, on 
                     
0
 Defendant, Joseph Huffman, was a subcontractor hired by 
Stabbert to fix the plumbing in the condominiums.  
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March 20, 1992, they instituted a civil action against the MTCA 
in the Territorial Court of the Virgin Islands.  The basis of the 
Seipels' complaint was that the MTCA violated the by-laws of the 
Mountain Top Condominiums by, inter alia, failing to appoint an 
Insurance Trustee to manage the distribution of the insurance 
proceeds.  This civil action is presently pending in the 
Territorial Court.0 
 When it became apparent that any settlement between 
MTCA, Stabbert and Huffman might deplete all of the remaining 
funds allocated for repairing the damage caused by Hurricane 
Hugo, the Seipels decided to intervene in the mediation process 
between the MTCA, Stabbert and Huffman.  On February 7, 1994, the 
day the mediation was to occur, counsel for the Seipels sent a 
written request to MTCA that he be allowed to attend the 
mediation.  When this request was denied, the Seipels filed a 
motion to intervene pursuant to Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, claiming that if the litigation between the MTCA 
and its contractor is successfully mediated, the entire $250,000 
escrow deposit may be lost.0  Both parties to the mediation 
opposed the proposed intervention. 
                     
0
 At oral argument both parties informed the court that the 
Territorial Court had ordered the MTCA to appoint an Insurance 
Trustee as required under the By-laws.  As of this date, the MTCA 
has failed to successfully appoint an Insurance Trustee. 
0
 Stabbert's and Huffman's claims amounted to more than the 
remaining $250,000 held in escrow, and prior to the litigation, 
the unit owners were informed that the board had depleted all 
money allocated for operating expenses so the insurance proceeds 
appeared to be the MTCA's only remaining funds. 
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 The district court denied the Seipels' motion to 
intervene.  The court held that the appellants', "only 
conceivable interest in this lawsuit lies in the fact that, if 
plaintiff [the MTCA] is successful, plaintiff may be in a 
somewhat better position to satisfy any judgment which the 
Seipels may succeed in obtaining in Territorial Court, than would 
be the case if plaintiff loses this lawsuit."  Mountain Top, slip 
op. at 5.  This appeal followed. 
II. 
 The District Court of the Virgin Islands had subject 
matter jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 4 V.I.C. § 32,0 
and Section 22 of the Revised Organic Act, 48 U.S.C. § 1611.0  We 
                                                                  
 While they contend that their damages are greater, at the 
very least the Seipel's claim an interest in the $21,482 
allocated to them under the Board's plan. 
0
 4 V.I.C. § 32 provides in pertinent part: 
 
 (a) Under section 22 of the Revised Organic Act, 
approved July 22, 1954, the district court has the 
original jurisdiction of a district court of the 
United States in all causes arising under the 
Constitution, treaties and laws of the United States, 
regardless of the sum or value of the matter in 
controversy, and has general original jurisdiction in 
all other causes in the Virgin Islands, where 
exclusive jurisdiction is not conferred upon the 
territorial court, as the inferior court of the 
Territory, by section 23 of the Revised Organic Act. 
When it is in the interest of justice to do so the 
district court may on motion of any party transfer to 
the district court any action or proceeding brought 
in the territorial court, and the district court 
shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine such 
action or proceeding. 
0
 48 U.S.C. § 1611 provides in pertinent part: 
 
 (a) . . . The judicial power of the Virgin 
Islands shall be vested in a court of record 
designated the "District Court of the Virgin Islands" 
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have jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  In 
reviewing a district court's decision denying intervention as a 
matter of right, we will reverse a district court's determination 
only if the court "has applied an improper legal standard or 
reached a decision that we are confident is incorrect."  Harris 
v. Pernsley, 820 F.2d 592, 597 (3d Cir. 1987) (citations 
omitted). 
III. 
 We have stated that a non-party is permitted to 
intervene under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2) only if: 
(1) the application for intervention is 
timely; (2) the applicant has a sufficient 
interest in the litigation; (3) the interest 
may be affected or impaired, as a practical 
matter by the disposition of the action; and 
(4) the interest is not adequately 
represented by an existing party in the 
litigation. 
Harris, 820 F.2d at 596.  Each of these requirements must be met 
to intervene as of right.  Id.  The district court denied 
appellants' motion because it found that they did not have a 
sufficient interest in the litigation, and thus had failed to 
satisfy subsection (2) of section 24(a).  Appellants argue that 
                                                                  
established by Congress, and in such appellate court 
and lower local courts as may have been or may 
hereafter be established by local law. 
 
 (b) . . . The legislature of the Virgin Islands 
may vest in the courts of the Virgin Islands 
established by local law jurisdiction over all causes 
in the Virgin Islands over which any court 
established by the Constitution and laws of the 
United States does not have exclusive 
jurisdiction. . . . 
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because a specific fund is at issue, they have a sufficient 
interest in the litigation pending in the district court. 
 While we will address each of Rule 24(a)'s 
requirements, we first turn to whether the appellants have a 
sufficient interest in the litigation. 
 A. 
  Rule 24(a)(2) requires the intervenor to 
demonstrate "an interest relating to the property or transaction 
which is the subject of the action . . ."  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
24(a)(2).  While the precise nature of the interest required to 
intervene as of right has eluded precise and authoritative 
definition, Harris, 820 F.2d at 596; 3B Moore's Federal Practice, 
¶ 24.07[2], at 24-57 (2d ed. 1982); 7C Wright, Miller & Kane, 
Federal Practice & Procedure § 1908, at 263 (1986), some general 
guidelines have emerged.  According to the Supreme Court, an 
intervenor's interest must be one that is "significantly 
protectable."  Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 531 
(1971).  In defining the contours of a "significantly 
protectable" legal interest under Rule 24(a)(2), we have held 
that, "'the interest must be a legal interest as distinguished 
from interests of a general and indefinite character.' * * * The 
applicant must demonstrate that there is a tangible threat to a 
legally cognizable interest to have the right to intervene." 
Harris, 820 F.2d at 601 (citations omitted).  This interest is 
recognized as one belonging to or being owned by the proposed 
intervenor.  United States v. Alcan Aluminum, Inc., 25 F.3d 1174, 
1185 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. 
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United Gas Pipe Line Co., 732 F.2d 452, 464 (5th Cir. 1984)).  We 
must therefore determine whether the proposed intervenors are 
real parties in interest.  Harris, 820 F.2d at 596-598. 
 In general, a mere economic interest in the outcome of 
the litigation is insufficient to support a motion to intervene. 
See, e.g., Alcan Aluminum, 25 F.3d at 1185 ("Some courts have 
stated that a purely economic interest is insufficient to support 
a motion to intervene."); New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. 
United Gas Pipe Line Co., 732 F.2d at 464 (in banc) ("It is plain 
that something more than an economic interest is necessary."). 
Thus, the mere fact that a lawsuit may impede a third party's 
ability to recover in a separate suit ordinarily does not give 
the third party a right to intervene.  See Hawaii-Pacific Venture 
Capital Corp. v. Rothbard, 564 F.2d 1343, 1346 (9th Cir. 1977). 
If the appellants' only interest in the present case was to 
ensure that the MTCA would have sufficient resources to satisfy 
any judgment they may be able to obtain in the territorial court 
action, the district court's reasoning and conclusion would be 
sound.  The district court's holding, however, does not recognize 
that the appellants claim an interest in a specific fund being 
held in the district court's registry. 
 While a mere economic interest may be insufficient to 
support the right to intervene, an intervenor's interest in a 
specific fund is sufficient to entitle intervention in a case 
affecting that fund.  See, e.g., Gaines v. Dixie Carriers, Inc., 
434 F.2d 52, 53-54 (5th Cir. 1970) (holding that a law firm could 
intervene in a former client's action to protect its interest in 
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its contingency fee); Hardy-Latham v. Wellons, 415 F.2d 674 (4th 
Cir. 1968) (holding that finders who supplied a broker with the 
name of a seller were allowed to intervene in the broker's case 
against the seller for a broker's fee because "[t]hey claim an 
interest in both the transaction and the fund which are the 
subject of the main action, and if the entire amount were paid 
directly to [the broker] their ability to collect their proper 
share would as a practical matter be impaired"); United States v. 
Eilberg, 89 F.R.D. 473 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (holding that two 
attorneys who claimed an interest in the same funds sought by the 
United States in a suit against a Congressman were entitled to 
intervene "whether their claim sounded in contract or tort, in 
law or equity."); Peterson v. United States, 41 F.R.D. 131 (D. 
Minn. 1966) (holding that the trust remaindermen had a sufficient 
interest to intervene in an action by the trust executors for a 
tax refund); see generally, Wright & Miller, supra, § 1908, at 
272-74 (and cases cited therein) ("`Interests in property are the 
most elementary type of right that Rule 24(a) is designed to 
protect,' and many of the cases in which a sufficient interest 
has been found under amended Rule 24(a)(2) have been cases in 
which there is a readily identifiable interest in land, funds, or 
some other form of property.").  Thus, when a particular fund is 
at issue, an applicant claims an interest in the very property 
that is the subject matter of the suit. 
 The $250,000 held in the district court registry 
represent all that remains of the hurricane reconstruction fund 
that the MTCA received to cover the cost of repairing the 
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condominiums in the aftermath of Hurricane Hugo.  According to 
Virgin Islands law and the MTCA's By-laws, this money is held in 
trust for each of the apartment owners under the supervision of 
an Insurance Trustee.  See 28 V.I.C. §924 ("Such insurance 
coverage shall be written on the property in the name . . . of 
the Board of Directors of the Association of Apartment Owners, as 
trustee for each of the apartment owners . . .") (emphasis 
added).  Similarly, Article V Section 2 of the MTCA's By-laws, 
requires the Board of Directors to obtain this insurance and 
appoint an Insurance Trustee to manage the funds.  App., Vol I., 
at 58.  Thus, the Seipels have a right to have an independent 
trustee appointed and to have that trustee "disburse the proceeds 
of all insurance policies to the contractors engaged in such 
repairs or restoration in appropriate progress payments."  App., 
Vol. I at 59.0 
 We agree with the Seipels that the funds deposited with 
the district court are assets of an express trust, of which the 
individual apartment owners are the intended beneficiaries.  Like 
all beneficiaries of an express trust, these beneficiaries have a 
property interest in the trust res that is enforceable either in 
law or in equity.  See generally, Restatement (2d) of Trusts, 
§§198-99 (1959).  Like all other beneficiaries of an express 
trust, they have an interest in seeing that the assets of the 
                     
0
 While the By-laws do not explicitly instruct the trustee as 
to how to set priorities among competing contractors, it seems 
implicit in the By-laws that the trustee would be required to 
distribute the proceeds in accordance with the By-laws, Virgin 
Islands law, and in the best interest of the beneficiaries (i.e., 
the condominium owners). 
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trust are not diverted in a manner that will defeat the purpose 
of the trust.0 
 The MTCA urges us to accept the district court's 
finding that the Seipels' "concession" that they have no interest 
in the merits of the litigation leads inexorably to the 
conclusion that they lack a sufficient stake in the litigation. 
According to the MTCA, by their own admission: 
[t]he Seipels have no interest in the merits 
of the Board's lawsuit against these 
Defendants; they are not privy to the 
underlying documents, and have no personal 
knowledge of the merits of that case, or the 
grounds for the dispute, other than that 
their 2 units were not repaired and restored. 
And accordingly, they did not then, and they 
do not now, seek to intervene so as to 
litigate the merits of the underlying suit. 
App., Vol. III, at 605.  The district court found this and 
similar statements sufficient to support its conclusion that, 
"[i]n essence, the Seipels wish merely to have a voice in 
controlling the timing and processing of this lawsuit (which is 
no concern of theirs) in the hope that, if they succeed in 
obtaining a judgment in the Territorial Court, they can satisfy 
it by recourse to the $250,000."  Mountain Top, slip op. at 4. 
This argument fails to recognize the scope of interests 
encompassed in Rule 24(a)(2).  Proposed intervenors need not have 
an interest in every aspect of the litigation.  They are entitled 
to intervene as to specific issues so long as their interest in 
those issues is significantly protectable.  See, e.g., Harris 820 
                     
0
 Judge Weis believes that the contractors who performed the 
work that provided the underlying basis for the insurance 
adjustment are beneficiaries as are the apartment owners. 
14 
F.2d at 599; Howard v. McLucas, 782 F.2d 956, 962 (11th Cir. 
1986) (holding that non-minority employees had the right to 
intervene to challenge the promotional remedy, but not to contest 
the existence of past discrimination); Bradley v. Milliken, 620 
F.2d 1141, 1142 (6th Cir. 1980) (holding that a representative of 
the Hispanic community has the right to intervene for the limited 
purpose of presenting evidence on the question of de jure 
segregation of Hispanics).  In this case, while the Seipels may 
not have an interest in the merits of the claims pending between 
MTCA and Huffman and Stabbert, they do have an interest in the 
property over which the court has taken jurisdiction.  Clearly 
they have an interest in being heard with respect to the 
disposition of that fund.0  As we have observed, such an interest 
is sufficient to support an applicant's intervention as of right.  
Accordingly, we find the appellants' interest in the litigation 
sufficient to support intervention as of right under Rule 
24(a)(2).0 
                     
0
 We do not say that the Seipels have a right to participate 
in a mediation of the claims between MTCA and Huffman and 
Stabbert insofar as that mediation is directed solely to the 
resolution of those claims and not to the disposition of the 
funds in the court's registry.  We do hold, however, that the 
Seipels have a right to participate in any proceeding that may 
result in the disbursement of those funds other than to a duly 
appointed independent trustee. 
0
 MTCA also argues that the appellants' interest is 
contingent upon the outcome of the case pending in the 
territorial court.  Appellees rely on decisions denying a third 
party's motion to intervene when the party's interest depended 
upon prevailing on a tort claim in a separate action.  See, e.g., 
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Pacific Indemnity Co., 76 F.R.D. 656 
(W.D. Pa. 1977); Independent Petrochemical Corp. v. Aetna Cas. 
and Sur. Co., 105 F.R.D. 106, 110 (D.D.C. 1985).  But see, 
Continental Casualty Co. v. SSM Group, Inc., No. CIV.A. 94-7789, 
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B. 
 In order to meet the requirements of Rule 24(a)(2), 
proposed intervenors must also demonstrate that their interest 
might become affected or impaired, as a practical matter, by the 
disposition of the action in their absence.  Alcan Aluminum, 25 
F.2d at 1185 n.15.  The contractors' claims against the MTCA in 
this case are in excess of $250,000.  Presumably, the MTCA could 
settle the case by paying the full $250,000 to the contractors, 
thus depleting the hurricane reconstruction fund.  If that were 
to occur, appellants would be the beneficiaries of an empty and 
worthless trust.  Similarly, if the MTCA were allowed to disburse 
the funds, most of the appellants' claims against the MTCA would 
become moot, including the claim that only a trustee should 
"receive all insurance proceeds following a loss."  App., Vol. I, 
at 39.  Moreover, any distribution, even a distribution which 
does not exhaust the fund, presumably usurps the authority of the 
trustee.  Accordingly, we conclude that appellants' interest in 
the fund as a practical matter may, indeed, become affected or 
impaired in their absence. 
C. 
 We must now determine whether the appellants' interests 
in the litigation are adequately represented.  Harris, 820 F.2d 
at 596.  As the Supreme Court stated, "[t]he requirement of the 
Rule is satisfied if the applicant shows that representation of 
                                                                  
1995 WL 422780 (E.D. Pa. 1995).  These cases simply do not apply 
here.  As we discuss above, appellants interest in the fund is 
clearly established by 28 V.I.C. § 924 and Article V § 2 of the 
MTCA's By-laws. 
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his interest `may be' inadequate; and the burden of making that 
showing should be treated as minimal."  Trbovich v. United Mine 
Workers, 404 U.S. 528, 538 n.10 (1972).  It has been noted that, 
The most important factor in determining 
adequacy of representation is how the 
interest of the absentee compares with the 
interest of the present parties.  If the 
interest of the absentee is not represented 
at all, or if all existing parties are 
adverse to him, then he is not adequately 
represented.  If his interest is identical to 
that of one of the present parties, or if 
there is a party charged by law with 
representing his interest, then a compelling 
showing should be required to demonstrate why 
this representation is not adequate. 
Wright & Miller, supra, § 1909, at 318-19; see generally Alcan 
Aluminum, 25 F.3d at 1185-86.  We therefore must determine 
whether the MTCA would adequately represent the appellants' 
interest in the district court action by comparing their 
respective interests.0 
 As we have noted, the Seipels wish to have the funds in 
the district court placed in the hands of an independent trustee 
so that the terms of the trust can be carried out.  It is 
apparent from the prior conduct of MTCA that it will not 
represent that point of view in this proceeding.  If an 
independent trustee is appointed and intervenes in this 
proceedings, the Seipels' interest will be adequately 
represented, but until that time, the Seipels must be permitted 
to advocate for implementation of the trust. 
                     
0
 There is no contention that the appellants are adequately 
represented by the contractors given that they are in fact 
competing over the funds deposited in the district court. 
17 
D. 
 The final requirement for intervention is that 
application for intervention be timely.  We review a district 
court's determination as to the timeliness of an intervention 
motion only for abuse of discretion.  Halderman v. Pennhurst 
State School & Hosp., 612 F.2d 131 (3d Cir. 1979).  In 
determining whether an application for intervention as of right 
is timely, we are reminded that, "[s]ince in situations in which 
intervention is of right the would-be intervenor may be seriously 
harmed if he is not permitted to intervene, courts should be 
reluctant to dismiss a request for intervention as untimely, even 
though they might deny the request if the intervention were 
merely permissive."  Wright & Miller, supra, § 1916 at 424. 
Appellees contend not only that the Seipels' motion was untimely, 
but that because the district court did not reach the issue, it 
is not properly before us.  (Appellees Brief at 20). 
 In its opinion, the district court stated that: 
The proposed intervenors are correct, in my 
view, in arguing that intervention is not 
precluded merely because of the passage of 
time between the filing of this lawsuit and 
the application for intervention:  From their 
perspective they did seek intervention 
promptly upon learning of the existence of 
the $250,00 escrow deposit, and upon becoming 
aware that their alleged interests might be 
in jeopardy in this litigation. 
Mountain Top, slip op., at 3-4.  We agree. 
 The timeliness of a motion to intervene is "`determined 
from all the circumstances' and, in the first instance, `by the 
[trial] court in the exercise of it sound discretion.'"  In re 
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Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation, 695 F.2d 494, 500 (3d Cir. 1982) 
(citing NAACP v. New York, 413 U.S. 345, 366 (1973)).  To 
determine whether the intervention motion is timely, we have 
listed three factors for courts to consider:  (1) the stage of 
the proceeding; (2) the prejudice that delay may cause the 
parties; and (3) the reason for the delay.  In re Fine Paper 
Antitrust Litigation, 695 F.2d at 500. 
1. 
 The MTCA argues that intervention at this stage is 
untimely and would prejudice them because the case is in an 
advanced stage.  The mere passage of time, however, does not 
render an application untimely.  Bank of America Nat. Trust and 
Sav. Ass'n v. Hotel Rittenhouse Associates, 844 F.2d 1050, 1056 
(3d Cir. 1988); Wright & Miller, supra, § 1916 at 425-26.  While 
four years had elapsed before the Seipels filed their motion to 
intervene, the critical inquiry is:  what proceedings of 
substance on the merits have occurred?  See In re Fine Paper 
Antitrust Litigation, 695 F.2d at 500 ("a motion to intervene 
after an entry of a decree should be denied except in 
extraordinary circumstances.") (emphasis added).  Cf. Hicks v. 
Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 349 (1975) (holding that, "where state 
criminal proceedings are begun against the federal plaintiffs 
after the federal complaint is filed but before any proceedings 
of substance on the merits have taken place . . . the principles 
of Younger v. Harris apply in full force.").  This is because the 
stage of the proceeding is inherently tied to the question of the 
prejudice the delay in intervention may cause to the parties 
19 
already involved.  See generally Wright & Miller, supra, § 1916 
at 435-456.  As a result, intervention has been allowed even 
after the entry of a judgment.  See, e.g., SEC v. United States 
Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434, 458-461 (1940); Wright & 
Miller, supra, § 1916 at 20 (cases cited therein). 
 The record before us reveals that while some written 
discovery and settlement negotiations had occurred between the 
MTCA and the contractors prior to the Seipels' motion, there were 
no depositions taken, dispositive motions filed, or decrees 
entered during the four year period in question.  Under these 
circumstances, we cannot say that intervention at this stage of 
the litigation would prejudice the current parties. 
2. 
 The heart of the MTCA's objection is that intervention 
would "essentially `deep six' any possible settlement." 
(Appellees brief at 21).  Even if we were to accept the MTCA's 
argument that intervention would prejudice settlement 
negotiations, that prejudice would not be attributable to any 
time delay.  Indeed, the only threat to settlement negotiations 
between the MTCA and the contractors that the intervention might 
pose would be that the MTCA and the contractors might have to 
consider the Seipels' legitimate interest in the funds at issue. 
But we do not see how this in any way dilutes our practice of 
encouraging the private settlement of disputes, see, e.g., 
Edwards v. Born, Inc., 792 F.2d 387, 390 (3d Cir. 1986), any more 
than recognizing the fundamental principal that an injured party 
has a legitimate right to redress. 
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3. 
 Finally, appellees argue that the Seipels have not 
expressed adequate reasons for their delay.  Again, we disagree. 
We have held that, "to the extent the length of time an applicant 
waits before applying for intervention is a factor in determining 
timeliness, it should be measured from the point at which the 
applicant knew, or should have known, of the risk to its rights." 
Alcan Aluminum, 25 F.3d at 1183.  The Seipels first learned that 
the $250,000 had been deposited with the court in a March 8, 1991 
memorandum from the Board.  At that time, however, the Board also 
predicted that the $250,000 would be returned to the MTCA, and 
that there would be a $130,000 surplus after reconstruction was 
completed.  When the Seipels filed suit in the Territorial Court 
in March of 1992, the Board informed the association members that 
the contractors would not release their interest in the $250,000. 
The Seipels claim that they reasonably concluded that the money 
would remain in the district court's registry throughout the 
litigation, beyond the reach of both the MTCA and the 
contractors.  They only became aware that the fund was in 
jeopardy by a memorandum dated February 2, 1994, when the Board 
informed the association members that the district court had 
ordered the parties to mediate.  The Seipels immediately sought 
to attend the mediation, which was scheduled for February 7, 
1994.  When they were not allowed to attend, they sought to 
intervene by motion filed on March 11, 1994.  There is, 
therefore, sufficient evidence in the record to support the 
district court's determination that the appellants "promptly" 
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sought intervention upon learning that their interests were in 
jeopardy. 
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IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the district 
court's denial of appellants' motion to intervene, and order the 
district court to grant the motion.  
